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“When the legislative and executive powwers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty.” – 
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the United States Constitution (“Constitution”), Congress has 
the power to create laws2 and holds the power of the purse,3 while the 
President ensures that the laws are faithfully executed.4  The separation 
of powers is something that American schoolchildren are taught from a 
young age; Congress passes laws and funds the agencies, and 
departments of the executive branch implement and enforce those laws.  
The judiciary has also illustrated the division of power between the 
executive and legislative branches of government.5  However, while this 
division seems straightforward, Congress has slowly increased its control 
over the activities of the executive branch through directly influencing 
administrative proceedings and through the use of substantive policy 
riders in the appropriation process.6  In fact, since the 1870s, Congress 
has attached policy riders to appropriation bills.7 
 
 1  CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1748), 
http://sourcebooks.fordham. edu/mod/montesquieu-spirit.asp. 
 2  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”). 
 3  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”).  
 4  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed”).  
 5  Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“Legislative power, as 
distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them”); 
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress may not 
“invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power.”).  
 6  Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 456, 462 (1987). 
 7  Id. (“By the 1940s, the use of riders was so widespread that the Joint Committee on 
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This Article investigates the legality and utility of Congressional 
interference in the administrative process.  Part II discusses direct 
Congressional interference in agency decision-making.  Part III examines 
the use of substantive appropriations riders to effectuate policy change.  
Part IV argues that substantive limitations placed on administrative 
agencies in the appropriations process are unconstitutional.  Part V 
discusses how, regardless of the constitutionality, limitation policy riders 
are not an effective policymaking vehicle.  Part VI provides case studies 
illustrating how current legislation possibly violates multiple clauses of 
the Constitution.  Part VII offers solutions to address the problems arising 
from the use of policy riders in the appropriation process.  From the 
outset, it is important to note that Congress has the constitutional ability 
to alter agency policy by simply passing a statute;8 however, this Article 
focuses on Congressional interference through other means.  Part VIII 
concludes. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH AGENCY DECISION-MAKING 
Currently, no federal law or internal rule prohibits a Member of 
Congress (“Member”) in the Senate or House of Representatives 
(“House”) from becoming involved in matters before a federal 
administrative agency, even to the extent of contacting, discussing with, 
and representing the interests of his or her constituents before an agency.  
However, the Senate and the House have internal rules that govern how 
Members interact with administrative agencies. 
A. Congressional Rules and Guidance 
On January 26, 1970, the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct issued Advisory Opinion No. 1 (“Advisory Opinion”) to provide 
guidance for Representatives when interacting with federal 
administrative agencies.9  The Advisory Opinion permits a 
Representative to communicate with an administrative agency on any 
matter to: 
Request information or a status report; urge prompt 
consideration; arrange for interviews or appointments; 
express judgment; call for reconsideration of an 
administrative response which he believes is not supported by 
established law, Federal regulation or legislative intent; 
perform any other service of a similar nature in this area 
 
the Organization of Congress recommended that the practice of attaching legislation to 
appropriations bills be discontinued.”). 
 8  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810) (“The courts will not overturn the 
action of a legislature because of the impure motives of certain of its members.”). 
 9  3 Lewis Deschler, Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, ch. 12, 
Appendix (1970) [hereinafter Deschler’s Precedents]. 
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compatible with the criteria hereinafter expressed in this 
Advisory Opinion.10 
Additionally, the Advisory Opinion requires Representatives to 
uphold a standard of conduct.  Specifically, Representatives must treat all 
constituents equally, pursue issues diligently irrespective of political or 
other considerations, and avoid any suggestion of either favoritism or 
reprisal to action taken by an agency.11 
On the other hand, the Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XLIII 
provides guidance for Senators when interacting with federal 
administrative agencies.12  Rule XLIII allows Senators to “assist 
constituents before federal administrative agencies by requesting 
information or a status report; urging prompt consideration of a matter; 
arranging for interviews or appointments; expressing judgments; or 
calling for reconsideration of an administrative response which the 
Member believes is not reasonably supported by statutes, regulations or 
considerations of public policy.”13  Senators are prohibited from 
advocating on behalf of constituents on the basis of contributions or 
services or on the promise of contributions or services.14 
B. Judicial Standards 
Judicial precedent can provide guidance to Members and the general 
public with respect to the nature and extent of allowable congressional 
intervention into agency adjudication and rulemaking.  Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), administrative action generally 
falls into two categories: adjudication or rulemaking.15  Under the APA, 
adjudication is the “agency process for the formulation of an order.”16  
Whereas, rulemaking is the “agency process for formulating, amending, 
or repealing a rule.”17 
Adjudication and rulemaking can be either formal or informal.  
Formal adjudication arises in “every case of adjudication required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing.”18  Informal adjudications are not accompanied by the 
protections of a judicial-like trial; importantly, the APA makes no 
 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 104-1, 102th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 43 (1992). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  5 U.S.C. § 551 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 16  § 551(7). 
 17  § 551(13). 
 18  § 554(a). 
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provision for informal adjudications.19  Informal rulemaking requires the 
administrative agency to publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register 
and provide “interested persons” an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking.20  Formal rulemaking must include a trial-type hearing at 
which a “party is entitled to present his case or defense or oral or 
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such 
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the 
facts.”21 
According to the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Act, a rulemaking proceeding is the “implementation or prescription of 
law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respondent’s 
past conduct . . . [c]onversely, adjudication is concerned with the 
determination of past and present rights and liabilities.”22  Because the 
purpose and focus of these administrative actions are dissimilar, Congress 
has imposed vastly different statutory procedural requirements. 
Courts have analyzed congressional intervention with respect to 
both adjudicatory actions and rulemaking actions; these issues will be 
discussed separately below. 
i. Adjudicatory Actions 
In Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,23 the Senate Subcommittee 
on Antitrust and Monopoly held a hearing with the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) Chairman on a key issue in an antitrust 
adjudication involving the Pillsbury Company which was pending before 
the FTC.24  During the hearing, multiple Senators, including the 
Committee Chair, criticized the FTC for its interpretation of the Clayton 
Act in a previous interlocutory order in Pillsbury’s favor.25  Subsequent 
to the hearing, in its final order, the FTC ruled against Pillsbury, as the 
Committee had suggested.26  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the divestiture order was invalid because the FTC’s decisional 
process had been tainted by impermissible congressional influence.27  
 
 19  Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass’n. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965, 970 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (“Unlike formal adjudication . . . the process did not involve trial-type, adversarial 
hearings.”). 
 20  § 553(c). 
 21  5 U.S.C. § 553(d). 
 22  U.S. Dep’t, of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure 
Act 14 (1947). 
 23  Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 354 F.2d 952, 952 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 24  Id. at 953. 
 25  Id. at 956-63. 
 26  Id. at 956. 
 27  Id. at 963. 
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Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held the Senate hearing was an “improper 
intrusion into the adjudicatory process of the [FTC].”28 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]o subject an administrator to a 
searching examination as to how and why he reached his decision in a 
case still pending before him, and to criticize him for reaching the 
‘wrong’ decision, as the Senate subcommittee did in this case, sacrifices 
the appearance of impartiality.”29  The Fifth Circuit concluded that it 
could “preserve the rights of the litigants in a case such as this without 
having any adverse effect upon the legitimate exercise of the investigative 
power of Congress.  What we do is to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
aspect of the administrative process.”30 
In Koniag v. Andrus,31 the House Subcommittee on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation held a hearing where the Chair, Representative 
Dingell, voiced his displeasure with some of the initial Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”) eligibility determinations for several communities to 
receive land and money under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(“ANCSA”).32  The D.C. Circuit Court held the Pillsbury decision was 
not applicable because none of the individuals called before the 
subcommittee was a decision-maker in the eligibility determinations and 
concluded that the hearing did not raise the appearance of impropriety.33 
The D.C. Circuit found that a letter sent by Representative Dingell 
to the Secretary of the Interior, only two days before he determined that 
a number of the villages were ineligible for Federal grants, did raise the 
appearance of impropriety.  Representative Dingell’s letter requested that 
the Secretary of the Interior postpone his decisions on the ANCSA claims 
because “testimony [at the hearings] that village eligibility and Native 
enrollment requirements of ANCSA have been misinterpreted in the 
regulations and that certain villages should not have been certified as 
eligible for land selections under ANCSA.”34  The D.C. Circuit held that 
while the letter did not specify any particular villages, it compromised the 
appearance of the Secretary of the Interior’s impartiality.35 
In Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,36 Peter 
 
 28  Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 354 F.2d 952, 963 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 29  Id. at 964. 
 30  Id. 
 31  Koniag v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 
(1978). 
 32  Id. at 612. 
 33  Id. at 610. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 163 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
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Kiewit Sons’ construction company was convicted of a Sherman Act 
violation.  Consequently, the Army Corps of Engineers, Department of 
the Army, and the Department of Defense, instituted debarment 
proceedings against the construction company.37  During an Armed 
Services Committee hearing, Senator Carl Levin questioned government 
officials about whether and why the Army Corps of Engineers had 
continued doing business with Peter Kiewit Sons’ construction 
company.38  Senator Levin also wrote a letter inquiring about the status 
of the debarment proceedings and met with top Army officials concerning 
the case.39 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a judicial or quasi-judicial 
proceeding could be invalidated by the appearance of bias or pressure and 
that “pressure on the decisionmaker alone, without proof or effect on the 
outcome, is sufficient to vacate a decision.”40  Moreover, the D.C. Circuit 
stated “[t]he test is whether ‘extraneous factors intruded into the calculus 
of consideration’ of the individual decisionmaker.”41  The D.C. Circuit 
ultimately held there was no actual nor apparent congressional 
interference since Senator Levin never communicated directly with the 
ultimate decisionmaker in the debarment proceedings, nor was it shown 
that that official was even aware of the Senator Levin’s 
communications.42 
In Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,43 the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), issued a number of 
decisions concerning the allocation of inexpensive hydroelectric power 
from the Niagara Power Project.44  The plaintiffs in the case argued that 
four Members of Congress allegedly engaged in ex parte 
communications with FERC in connection with the proceedings.  The 
communications consisted of a letter from two Members of Congress 
from New York: Representative Jack Kemp and Representative Barber 
Conable to President Ronald Reagan.  President Reagan forwarded the 
Kemp/Conable letter to the Chairman of FERC, C.M. Butler III.  During 
 
 37  Id. at 163. 
 38  Id. at 167. 
 39  Id. at 166. 
 40  Id. at 169. 
 41  Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 714 F.2d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (emphasis in original) (quoting D. C. Federation of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 
1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).  
 42  Id. 
 43  Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., 743 F.2d 93, 93 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
 44  Id. at 98 (“The project can be traced back to 1950, when the United States and Canada 
signed a treaty providing for expanded use of the Niagara River for hydropower generation.”).  
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a press conference attended by the four defendants, FERC officials and 
the public, the Legal Advisor to Chairman Butler read part of Chairman 
Butler’s reply to the Kemp/Conable letter, which was then followed by 
criticism of FERC’s decision by several Members of Congress.45 
The Second Circuit empathized with the plaintiffs and reasoned that 
“[e]x parte communications by Congressmen or anyone else with a 
judicial or quasi-judicial body regarding a pending matter are improper 
and should be discouraged.”46  However, the Second Circuit found that 
the mere existence of such communications does not require a court or 
administrative body to disqualify itself and that in this case, the plaintiffs 
were promptly made aware of the Kemp/Conable letter and had a full 
opportunity to comment and respond.47 
ii. Non-Adjudicatory Actions 
Courts have addressed claims of undue congressional influence 
which are outside the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. 
In D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, the plaintiffs argued that a 
decision to approve construction of the Three Sisters Bridge across the 
Potomac River by the Secretary of Transportation was tainted by 
extraneous pressure.48  Representative Bill Natcher, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia Appropriations had 
jurisdiction over the funding of the District of Columbia’s transportation 
construction projects.  Plaintiffs alleged that Representative Natcher 
threatened to deny funds for the District of Columbia’s proposed subway 
system unless the Three Sisters Bridge project was approved and that 
those threats had a legal impact on the Secretary of Transportation’s 
subsequent approval decision.49 
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the impact of the threat was 
sufficient, standing alone, to invalidate the Secretary of Transportation’s 
action and held that “[e]ven if the Secretary had taken every formal step 
required by every applicable statutory provision, reversal would be 
required . . . because extraneous pressure intruded into the calculus of 
considerations on which the Secretary’s decision was based.”50 
The D.C. Circuit opined that: 
the underlying problem cannot be illuminated by a simplistic 
effort to force the Secretary’s action into a purely judicial or 
 
 45  Id. at 109. 
 46  Id. at 110. 
 47  Id. 
 48  D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1235 (1971), cert. denied 405 
U.S. 1030 (1972). 
 49  Id. at 1236-37. 
 50  Id. at 1245-46. 
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purely legislative mold.  His decision was not “judicial” in 
that he was not required to base it solely on a formal record 
established at a public hearing.  At the same time, it was not 
purely “legislative” since Congress had already established 
the boundaries within which his discretion could operate.  But 
even though his action fell between these two conceptual 
extremes, it is still governed by principles that we had thought 
elementary and beyond dispute.  If, in the course of reaching 
his decision, Secretary Volpe took into account 
“considerations that Congress could not have intended to 
make relevant,” his action proceeded from an erroneous 
premise and his decision cannot stand.  The error would be 
more flagrant, of course, if the Secretary had based his 
decision solely on the pressures generated by Representative 
Natcher.  But it should be clear that his action would not be 
immunized merely because he also considered some relevant 
factors.51 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision illustrates the difficult issues arising from 
judicial review of congressional interference in agency decisions, some 
of which are adjudicatory and some of which are legislative. 
iii. Rulemaking Actions 
In Sierra Club v. Costle,52 the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) engaged in an informal rulemaking to update its source pollution 
standards (“NSPS”) mandated by the Clean Air Act.53  Plaintiffs argued, 
among other things, that the EPA engaged in post-comment meetings and 
received ex parte communications from Members of Congress that had 
caused the EPA to withdraw its support of a more stringent emission 
standard and was therefore unlawful and prejudicial.54 
The D.C. Circuit held that if Congress wanted to forbid or limit ex 
parte contact in cases of informal rulemaking, it would have done so.55  
The Court reasoned that where 
agency action resembles judicial action, where it involves 
formal rulemaking, adjudication, or quasi-adjudication 
among ‘conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege,’ the 
insulation of the decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is 
justified by basic notions of due process to the parties 
involved.  But where agency action involves informal 
rulemaking of a policymaking sort, the concept of ex parte 
contacts is of more questionable utility.56 
The Court further reasoned that “a judicially imposed blanket 
 
 51  Id. at 1247-48. 
 52  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 298 (1981). 
 53  Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(6) (Westlaw current through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 54  Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 386-87 (finding the plaintiff objected to multiple meetings 
held with then Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd). 
 55  Id. at 401. 
 56  Id. at 400. 
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requirement that all post-comment period oral communications be 
docketed would . . . contravene our limited powers of review, would stifle 
desirable experimentation in the area by Congress and the agencies, and 
is unnecessary for achieving the goal of an established, procedure-defined 
docket.”57 
The Court held that it was entirely proper for Members of Congress 
to represent the interests of their constituents before administrative 
agencies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking and that before 
an administrative rulemaking could be overturned simply on the grounds 
of political pressure, it had to be shown that “the content of the pressure 
on the [decisionmaker] is designed to force him to decide upon factors 
not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute” and also that the 
determination made “must be affected by those extraneous 
considerations.”58 
Courts have used the Sierra Club test to determine when political 
pressure will invalidate an agency rulemaking.  However, this is a high 
bar to meet.  For example, in Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest v. Dep’t of 
Treasury,59 the D.C. District Court stated that “[p]laintiffs cite no case, 
and we know of none, in which an agency decision was invalidated 
because the agency had received letters from congressmen arguing for a 
certain outcome.”60  In Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, the Southern District 
of New York held that “to state a cause of action for improper political 
influence on an administrative agency,” there must be some “factual basis 
for a claim that: (1) the content of the pressure on the agency was 
designed to force it to decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress 
in the applicable statute; and (2) the agency’s determination must have 
been affected by those extraneous considerations.”61 
C. Congressional Review Act 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows Congress to 
review actions taken by administrative agencies.  The Congressional 
Review Act (“CRA”) requires the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) to report to Congress on whether an agency, in promulgating a 
major rule, has complied with the regulatory process.  Under Section 801 
of the APA, “[b]efore a rule can take effect, the Federal agency 
 
 57  Id. at 403. 
 58  Id. at 409-10.  
 59  Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest v. Dep’t of Treasury, 573 F. Supp. 1168, 1168 (D.D.C. 
1983). 
 60  Id. at 1179. 
 61  Orangetown v. Ruckelshaus, 579 F. Supp. 15, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Sierra Club, 
657 F.2d at 409). 
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promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress and 
to the Comptroller General a report containing: (i) a copy of the rule; (ii) 
a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a 
major rule; and (iii) the proposed effective date of the rule.”62  The 
submission shall include: a cost-benefit analysis (if one was prepared), 
the agency’s actions relevant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the 
agency’s actions relevant to the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act and “any 
other relevant information or requirements under any other Act and any 
relevant Executive orders.”63  GAO’s report must be made to each house 
of Congress no later than 15 calendar days after a rule’s submission or 
publication date.64 
The CRA established expedited (“fast track”) procedures by which 
Congress may disapprove a broad range of regulatory rules issued by 
federal agencies by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval.65  Under 
Section 801, “[a] rule shall not take effect (or continue), if the Congress 
enacts a joint resolution of disapproval, described under section 802.”66  
Under Section 802, Congress can pass a joint resolution stating that 
“‘Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the ——— relating to —
——, and such rule shall have no force or effect’ (The blank spaces being 
appropriately filled in).”67  Importantly, if a rule is disapproved after 
going into effect, it is “treated as though [it] had never taken effect.”  
Furthermore, another very important point in the context of a fiduciary 
rule is that if a disapproval resolution is enacted, the rule may not take 
effect and the agency may issue no substantially similar rule without 
subsequent statutory authorization.68 
The disapproval process under the CRA begins when a Member of 
Congress, House or Senate, submits a joint resolution of disapproval.  The 
joint resolution is referred to the House and Senate committee with 
jurisdiction.69  The Congressional Research Service provides a useful 
illustration of the varying outcomes of CRA review:70 
 
 62  5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 63  § 801(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iv). 
 64  § 801(a)(2)(A). 
 65  RICHARD BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY 
CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 1 (2001). 
 66  § 801(b)(2) (“A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue) under paragraph 
(1) may not be reissued in substantially the same form, and a new rule that is substantially the 
same as such a rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically 
authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original 
rule.”). 
 67  § 802(a). 
 68  § 801(b). 
 69  Id. 
 70  RICHARD BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY 
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No Congressional Action. If neither house of Congress acts 
on a disapproval resolution during the original waiting 
period, the rule takes effect when that period expires (or later, 
if so provided in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act or the terms of the rule itself). 
Rejection by Either House. If either house votes to reject the 
disapproval resolution, the action presumably ensures that no 
disapproval resolution will pass both chambers. At that point 
the waiting period is vitiated, and the rule may take effect 
immediately (or later, if so required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act or the rule itself). 
Passage by Both Houses; No Veto. If both houses pass the 
disapproval resolution and the President does not veto it, the 
resolution becomes law, and the rule becomes “of no force 
and effect” (whether or not the waiting period has expired). 
Passage; Veto; No Attempt to Override. If both houses pass 
the disapproval resolution and the President vetoes it, the 
receipt by Congress of the veto message triggers the new 
waiting period of 30 days of session. If a vote on overriding 
the veto occurs in neither house, or in only one house, during 
this new waiting period, the rule takes effect when the 30 days 
of session expire (or later, if so required by other authorities). 
Passage; Veto Sustained by Either House. If either house 
votes to sustain the veto, Congress can no longer override. At 
that point the additional 30-day waiting period is vitiated, and 
the rule may take effect immediately (or later, if so required 
by other authorities). 
Passage; Veto Overridden. If both houses override the veto, 
the disapproval resolution becomes law, so that the rule 
becomes “of no force and effect.”71 
It is important to note that “the [CRA] provides no expedited 
procedure for overriding a veto.  Consideration of veto messages is 
generally considered privileged in both chambers pursuant to the 
requirements of the Constitution.  The procedures of neither house, 
however, require a vote on whether to override.  In the Senate, an attempt 
to reach such a vote might be delayed or blocked by filibuster.  In other 
respects, the normal procedures of each house probably would suffice to 
allow a majority that wished an override vote to secure one.”72 
However, even though Congress has this power of review, it is rarely 
used.  In 2006, the GAO found from 1996 to 2006, Members of Congress 
introduced only thirty-seven CRA disapproval resolutions, and only one 
of those was ultimately approved.73  This number is infinitesimal (less 
than one percent) compared to the total number of rules proposed by 
agencies in that same time period, which the GAO reported as 41,828 
 
CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 8-9 (2001). 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. at 14. 
 73 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-601T, PERSPECTIVES ON 10 YEARS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT IMPLEMENTATION, 1, 3 (2006). 
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major and non-major rules.74 
III. EFFECTUATING POLICY CHANGE THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE 
APPROPRIATIONS RIDERS 
Congress’ power of the purse is a powerful tool and the 
appropriations process is “one of the most important authorities allocated 
to Congress.”75  Courts have stated that “constitutional structure would 
collapse, and the role of the House would be meaningless, if the 
Executive could circumvent the appropriations process and spend funds 
however it pleases.”76  However, while Congress holds the purse strings, 
it cannot intrude on the Executive’s authority of enforcing laws.77  
Therefore, it is important to note that this Article focuses on substantive 
limitations placed on executive agencies in the appropriations process, 
rather than constitutionally-acceptable funding decisions made by 
Congress.78 
A. Congressional Rules and Guidance 
The Senate and House have internal rules that encourage the 
separation of money and policy decisions.  Specifically, legislating 
through appropriations riders violates Senate and House rules—
legislative provisions typically may not be included in appropriations 
measures.79  It is important to note that these rules only apply to general 
appropriations bills,80 they do not apply to continuing resolutions.81 
In the House, House Rule XXI prohibits legislative provisions from 
 
 74  Id. at 4. 
 75  THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison) (“This power over the purse may, in fact, 
be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people”). 
 76  United States House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F.Supp.3d 53, 73 (D.D.C. 
2015). 
 77  U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2. 
 78  These would be limitations that restrict the amount or availability of funds without 
changing the existing law. 
 79  Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 24 (“Generally, language in an 
appropriation bill proposing to repeal existing law is legislation and not in order. Similarly, 
an amendment in the form of a limitation but construing or interpreting existing law is 
legislation and not in order on an appropriation bill.”). 
 80  JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS 
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 13 (2014) (“The appropriations process assumes the 
consideration of 12 regular appropriations measures annually. Each House and Senate 
appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction over one regular bill”). 
 81  Id. at 14 (“Traditionally, continuing appropriations have been used to maintain 
temporary funding for agencies and programs until the regular bills are enacted. Such 
appropriations continuing funding are usually provided in a joint resolution, hence the term 
continuing resolution (or CR)). 
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being reported in general appropriation bills and amendments to 
appropriation bills containing language that would alter existing laws are 
also prohibited.82  Clause 5 of House Rule XXI also bars legislative 
language in conference reports that accompany appropriations acts.83  In 
the Senate, Senate Rule XVI restricts legislative language not contained 
within existing law from being added via amendment to a general 
appropriations bill unless it is determined to be made to carry out the 
provisions of some existing law.84  These rules are enforced on the House 
and Senate floor by points of order.85  It is important to note that since 
House and Senate rules are not self-enforcing, a point of order must be 
made against a legislative provisions, and without this action, the 
provision could be considered and adopted.86 
Members of Congress, while being subject to these restrictions on 
the use of legislative language in appropriations bills, have procedures to 
circumvent these rules.  First, the House may “grant unanimous consent 
that points of order be waived against all of the provisions contained in 
an appropriation bill.”87  Second, the House may “adopt a resolution 
waiving points of order against a section of an appropriation bill which 
contains legislative provisions in violation of Clause 2 of Rule XXI.”88 
IV. POLICY RIDERS IN APPROPRIATIONS MEASURES ARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Under the Constitution, the President shall ensure that laws are 
faithfully executed89 and the “executive Power shall be vested in a 
 
 82  Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. DOC. NO 113-181, 113th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. §§ 1034-35 (2015). 
 83  Id. at § 1064. 
 84   Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (2015). 
 85  JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., POINTS OF ORDER IN THE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 1-2 (2015) (“Points of order are typically in the form of a 
provision stating that “it shall not be in order” for the House or Senate to take a specified 
action or consider certain legislation. When a point of order is sustained against consideration 
of some matter, the effect is that the matter in question falls.”). 
 86  U.S. House of Reps. Comm. On Rules, Budget Act Points of Order Applicable in the 
House of Representatives, available at http://archives.democrats.rules.house.gov/POP/ 
budget_points.htm (“Points of order are not self-enforcing, but rather are only brought into 
play when a member raises a “point of order” against a specific Congressional action prior to 
or during its consideration.”) 
 87  Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 3.1. (“Unanimous consent is “[a] proposal 
that all members (of a chamber or committee) agree to set aside one or more chamber or 
committee rules to take some action otherwise not in order. If any member objects to such a 
request, it is not agreed to.”). 
 88  Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 3.2. 
 89  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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President of the United States of America.”90  This power has been 
affirmed since the beginning of our Democracy.  For example, James 
Madison stated that “if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, 
it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who 
execute the laws.”91 
For the legislative branch, the Constitution does not differentiate 
Congress’ authority to appropriate funds from its other legislative 
powers.  However, this Article contends that while Congress has 
authority to fund, or not to fund, the government, it has no authority to 
direct administrative agencies’ execution of the law and that any action 
by Congress in that respect would be unconstitutional.  The Supreme 
Court has held that “Congress can thereafter control the execution of [a 
law’s] enactment only indirectly—by passing new legislation.”92  In 
effect, Congress cannot direct the interpretation of laws it has passed 
without amending the underlying statute.  This is plain in the wording of 
the Constitution, where it separates Congress’ authority to create law 
from the executive branch’s ability to enforce it.93 
A. Separation of Powers 
It is important to note that courts have consistently upheld agencies’ 
power to carry out legislative policies embodied in federal statutes, i.e., 
create rules to implement statutory law.  The Supreme Court has long 
held that courts are not permitted “to probe the mental processes” of 
administrators94 and that “the integrity of the administrative process must 
be . . . respected.”95  In Myers v. United States96 the Supreme Court held 
that “there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on 
executive officers and members of executive tribunals whose decisions 
after hearing affect interests of individuals.”97  In Humphrey’s Ex’r v. 
United States,98 the Supreme Court held that: 
Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created 
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied 
in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard 
 
 90  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 91  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. James 
Madison) (emphasis added). 
 92  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
 93  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 94  Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938). 
 95  Morgan v. United States, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941). 
 96  Myers v. United States 272 U.S. 52, 52 (1926). 
 97  Id. at 135. 
 98  Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935). 
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therein prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a 
legislative or as a judicial aid . . . In administering the 
provisions of the statute in respect of ‘unfair methods of 
competition—that is to say in filling in and administering the 
details embodied by that general standard—the commission 
acts in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially.99 
Courts have consistently upheld agency rulemakings based upon a 
delegation of authority from Congress.  In Mistretta v. United States100, 
the Supreme Court held that Congress could not do its job absent an 
ability to delegate power to executive agencies.101  The Court deemed it 
“constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general 
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this 
delegated authority.”102  In Northwest Forest Resource v. Pilchuck 
Audubon Soc’y,103 the Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he power of the 
Secretaries to administer the Congressionally created program 
‘necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to 
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”104  This 
delegation authority is even more powerful with respect to certain 
agencies.  For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States,105 the 
Supreme Court held that “ever since the inception of the Tax Code, 
Congress has seen fit to vest in those administering the tax laws very 
broad authority to interpret those laws.”106 
Courts have also repeatedly affirmed that Congress’ power is bound 
by the Constitution.  In Buckley v. Valeo,107 the Supreme Court held that 
“Congress’ power. . .is inevitably bounded by the express language” of 
the Constitution.108  In Loving v. United States,109 the Supreme Court held 
that one branch of government could not “impair another in the 
performance of its constitutional duties.”110  In INS v. Chadha,111 the 
Supreme Court held that a one-house legislative veto was 
unconstitutional because “each House of Congress retained the power to 
reverse a decision Congress had expressly authorized the Attorney 
 
 99  Id. at 628. 
 100  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. at 372-73. 
 103  Nw. Forest Res. v. Pilchuck Audubon Soc’y, 97 F.3d 1161, 1169 (1996). 
 104  Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
 105  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976). 
 108  Id.  
 109  Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996). 
 110  Id.  
 111  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 919 (1983). 
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General to make.”112  The Court reasoned that: 
[d]isagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on 
Chadha’s deportation—that is, Congress’ decision to deport 
Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate 
to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, 
involves determinations of policy that Congress can 
implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by 
presentment to the President.  Congress must abide by its 
delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively 
altered or revoked.113 
In Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund,114 the 
Supreme Court held that while Congress may inform itself of how 
legislation is being implemented through legislative oversight and 
investigation, Congress is forbidden from intervening in the decision 
making necessary to execute the law.115  In Bowsher v. Synar, the 
Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution does not contemplate an 
active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the 
execution of the laws it enacts.”116  The Supreme Court reasoned that: 
to permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the 
laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto.  
Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an 
officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be 
unsatisfactory to Congress.  This kind of congressional 
control over the execution of the laws, Chadha makes clear, 
is constitutionally impermissible.117 
There is limited precedent that speaks directly to the constitutionality of 
substantive policy riders in appropriations bills.  In United States v. 
Dickerson,118 the Supreme Court stated that there was no doubt that 
Congress could use the appropriation process to amend an underlying 
statute.119  In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,120 the Supreme Court 
 
 112  Id.  
 113  Id. at 954-55.  See also Constitutionality of Congress’ Disapproval of Agency 
Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A OP. O.L.C. 21, 27 (1980) 
(opinion of the Attorney General) (“[O]nce a function has been delegated to the executive 
branch, it must be performed there, and cannot be subjected to continuing congressional 
control except through the constitutional process of enacting new legislation.”). 
 114  Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) 
 115  Id. (citing Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 115 L. Ed. 2d 236, 236 (1991) (“The Court recalled that the Framers 
recognized that ‘power is of an encroaching nature,’ The Federalist No. 48, at 332 (J. 
Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), and therefore the Constitution imposes a structural ban on 
legislative intrusions into other governmental functions.”).  
 116  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). 
 117  Id. at 726.  
 118  United States v. Dickerson, 301 U.S. 554, 555 (1940). 
 119  Id. 
 120  Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978). 
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recognized 
both substantive enactments and appropriations measures are 
‘Acts of Congress,’ but the latter have the limited and specific 
purpose of providing funds for authorized programs.  When 
voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to 
operate under the assumption that the funds will be devoted 
to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose 
forbidden.  Without such an assurance, every appropriations 
measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering 
substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior 
statute which might prohibit the expenditure.  Not only would 
this lead to the absurd result of requiring Members to review 
exhaustively the background of every authorization before 
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules 
the Congress carefully adopted to avoid this need.121 
In Preterm v. Dukakis,122 a case looking at exclusive state financing of 
abortions and the Medicaid Act, the First Circuit was “persuaded that 
Congress realized that it was using the unusual and frowned upon device 
of legislating via an appropriations measure to accomplish a substantive 
result.”123  In Doe v. Busbee,124 the Northern District of Georgia found a 
“recognized and settled policy of Congress against legislating in an 
appropriations context.”125  In Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar,126 
the United States District Court for the District of Montana opined that 
“[i]nserting environmental policy changes into appropriations bills may 
be politically expedient, but it transgresses the process envisioned by the 
Constitution by avoiding the very debate on issues of political importance 
said to provide legitimacy.”127 
In a contrary holding, in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y,128 the 
Supreme Court held that “although repeals by implication are especially 
disfavored in the appropriations context, Congress nonetheless may 
amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so 
clearly.”129  However, with respect to administrative regulations that 
implement statutory law, the Supreme Court has stated that “Congress 
must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is altered or 
revoked.”130  Importantly, the Supreme Court in Buckley affirmed that the 
enforcement power of the executive branch includes the power to 
 
 121  Id.  
 122  Preterm v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 131 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 123  Id. 
 124  Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979). 
 125  Id. 
 126  All. for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (D. Mont. 2011). 
 127  Id.  
 128  Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (citations omitted). 
 129  Id.  
 130  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 657 (1988).  
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implement the law.131  In Bowsher, the Supreme Court held that 
“[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative 
mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”132 
This Article advocates that the approach taken by the courts in TVA, 
Preterm, Doe, and Alliance is the correct approach, and it argues that 
rather than using the appropriations process to amend an underlying 
statute, Congress may have the authority to mandate a certain 
interpretation of the statutory laws it has created.  This factual situation 
is distinguishable from Robertson, in which the Court found that 
Congress was making changes in law, not findings or results under old 
law, and would instead rely on Olson, which found that Congress’s 
delegation stands until it is revoked, and Bowsher and Buckley, which 
found that the executive’s authority to execute the law includes the power 
to implement the law through regulation. 
These cases illustrate that Congress potentially violates the 
separation of powers under the Constitution when it directs executive and 
independent agencies to interpret statutes in a certain way. 
B. Presentment Clause 
The use of substantive policy riders in the appropriations process 
violates both the letter and the spirit of the Presentment Clause of the 
Constitution.133  In TVA, the Supreme Court held that the use of 
appropriation bills to make substantive changes in legislation would “lead 
to the absurd result of requiring Congress to review exhaustively the 
background of every authorization before voting on an appropriation.”134 
In Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court held that the use 
of a “line item veto” by President Bill Clinton was unconstitutional.135  
The Supreme Court reasoned that, among other things, if the line item 
veto had been valid, then it would have authorized the President to create 
a law whose text was not voted on by either house of Congress or 
 
 131  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976). 
 132  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
 133  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of 
the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections 
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their 
journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two thirds of that House 
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, 
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it 
shall become a law”).  
 134  Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978). 
 135  Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). 
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presented to the President for signature.”136  This reasoning is important; 
riders to appropriation bills undermine “deliberative lawmaking, which 
requires legislators to (1) make explicit policy choices, (2) employ 
procedures that limit arbitrary action, and (3) produce a record that is 
subject to meaningful judicial review.”137  Substantive changes to 
existing legislation through appropriation riders do not receive adequate 
attention and are generally introduced late in the process, with little 
debate.138 
This Article contends that since the appropriation riders do not go 
through the normally-required legislative procedures, often without 
debate and obscured in voluminous budget documents, the riders would 
authorize the President to create a law whose text was not subject to a 
deliberative vote in Congress and a law that was not presented to the 
President for his or her signature.  In other words, the process removes 
the President’s veto authority by attaching riders to must-pass spending 
bills.  As a result, this process violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
Constitution and delegitimizes the legislative process.139 
C. Due Process 
Policy riders that force administrative action have the potential to 
violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  The Constitution states 
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”140  The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that 
“[c]ontract rights are a form of property and as such may be taken . . . 
provided that just compensation is paid”141 and “[v]alid contracts are 
property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a 
State, or the United States.”142  It is important to note that the Contracts 
Clause of the Constitution would not be applicable, since it only applies 
to states, not the federal government.143 
 
 136  Id. at 448. 
 137  Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Salazar: Congress Behaving Badly, 
25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 394 (2014).  
 138  Id. at 395. 
 139  See All. for the Wild Rockies, 800 F. Supp. 2d at1123. 
 140  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 141  U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1977).  
 142  Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). 
 143  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall. . .pass any. . .Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts.”). Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984) 
(“The Supreme Court has also stated that “we have contrasted the limitations imposed on 
States by the Contract Clause with the less searching standards imposed on economic 
legislation by the Due Process Clause”). 
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The recent Department of Labor (“DOL”) “fiduciary” 
rulemaking,144 is a notable example of how Congressional riders could 
potentially violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  The DOL 
rule requires firms and advisors to enter into “Best Interest Contracts” 
(“BICs”) with their clients.145  This requirement becomes applicable on 
January 1, 2018.146  If Congress uses a policy rider to delay or repeal the 
DOL rule before this date, due process concerns will likely not arise.  
However, Congress could act unconstitutionally by delaying or repealing 
the rule after January 1, 2018.147 
The Supreme Court has stated that “Congress has considerable 
leeway to fashion economic legislation, including the power to affect 
contractual commitments between private parties.”148  Additionally, it is 
“well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits 
of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due 
process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary 
and irrational way.”149 
In a landmark decision, Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,150 
the Supreme Court held the federal government had a broadly applicable 
defense against takings actions based on interference with existing 
private contracts.  Specifically, the Supreme Court found that government 
actions that only incidentally interfere with performance of private 
contracts—rather than targeting them directly—constitute a “frustration,” 
not a taking, of those contract rights.151 
While the Omnia decision is broad, it does have its limitations.  Most 
importantly, Omnia does not apply when legislation expressly “targets” 
an existing contract right—rather than affecting contract rights only 
 
 144  Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509, 2510, 2550); Best Interest 
Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21002 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pt. 2550). 
 145  Best Interest Contract Exemption; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 44773 (Jul. 11, 2016) (29 
CFR Pt. 2550).  
 146  Best Interest Contract Exemption; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 44773 (Jul. 11, 2016) (29 
CFR Pt. 2550). 
 147  Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (“It does not 
follow . . . that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The 
retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”) (quoting Usery 
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)). 
 148  E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528 (1998). 
 149  Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993) 
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). 
 150  Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 510 (1923). 
 151  Id. at 513. 
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incidentally.152  In these cases, the Supreme Court uses the test described 
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.153  Accordingly, under 
Penn Central Transp., courts apply the following test: (1) the economic 
impact of the government action on the property owner; (2) the degree of 
interference with the property owner’s investment-backed expectations; 
and (3) the “character” of the government action.154 
This Article contends that the use of a policy rider to delay or repeal 
the DOL rule, after the January 1, 2018 applicability date, would violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by specifically targeting the 
BIC contracts entered into by advisors and their clients. 
First, the action would directly target and nullify the BIC contracts.  
In a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
report, Senator Ron Johnson cites experts and states that “[t]o take 
advantage of the BIC exemption, the investor and advisor must sign a 
contract acknowledging fiduciary status.  The advisor must act in the best 
interest of the client and must make numerous disclosures to the client 
and to the Labor Department.  Experts contend that the BIC exemption is 
unworkable and will increase the cost of investment advice and services 
and will, consequently, decrease access to investment services for small 
investors.”155 
In September 2015, during a hearing before the House 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 
Chairman Peter Roskam stated: 
[u]nder the proposed fiduciary rule, commission-based plans 
would be virtually eliminated.  There is an exception if the 
advisors and their clients enter into a so-called best-interest 
contract, but this . . . creates a legal and financial liability for 
investment advisors that will have serious consequences on 
access to competent and affordable financial advice.156 
In the same hearing, Representative Joseph Crowley stated that he had 
been informed that “there . . . [are] too many compliance burdens in the 
 
 152  Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Omnia 
refers to legislation targeted at some public benefit, which incidentally affects contract rights, 
not. . .legislation aimed at the contract rights themselves in order to nullify them.”). 
 153  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 154  Id. at 124.  
 155  Senator Ron Johnson, The Labor Department’s Fiduciary Rule: How a Flawed 
Process Could Hurt Retirement Savers, A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT OF THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Feb. 24, 2016, at 29, 
available at https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/the-labor-departments-fiduciary-rule-
how-a-flawed-process-could-hurt-retirement-savers. 
 156  Hearing on the Department of Labor’s Proposed Fiduciary Rule, Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (opening 
statement by Chairman Peter Roskam), available at https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/20150930OS-Transcript.pdf. 
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proposed BIC exemption.”157  In the April 2016 disapproval motion filed 
by Congress under the CRA, Members of Congress contended that “[t]he 
BIC exemption was widely panned as [] unworkable.”158 
Based on these on the record statements, it will be difficult for 
Members of Congress to fashion a policy rider that would repeal the DOL 
rule without targeting the BIC contract.  Once it is established that a 
policy rider repealing the rule would target the BIC contracts, the Penn 
Central test must be applied. 
First, the economic impact on the property owners, specifically 
holders of Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRA”) under the BIC, will 
be enormous.  Assets in IRAs totaled $7.8 trillion at the end of the third 
quarter of 2016.159  In its Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”), the DOL 
found that the rule may result in a gain between $40 billion and $44 
billion over 10 years for IRA investors.160 
Second, the degree of interference is substantial.  Repealing the rule 
would effectively revert retirement investors’ back to their pre-enactment 
financial position, where the DOL found that for mutual fund investments 
in IRAs alone, investors would lose between $210 billion and $430 
billion over 10 years, and between $500 billion and $1 trillion over 20 
years as a result of conflicted advice.  According to the DOL’s analysis, 
an investor who moves money out of a 401(k) plan and into an IRA based 
on conflicted advice can expect to lose twelve to twenty-four percent of 
the value of his or her savings over 30 years.161 
Third, Congress’s use of a policy rider in an appropriations bill to 
repeal the DOL rule would be an arbitrary and irrational action.  It is “well 
established that . . . the burden is on one complaining of a due process 
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and 
irrational way.”162  The DOL provided an exhaustive (almost 400-page) 
impact analysis based upon a wealth of academic and empirical 
evidence.163  For Congress to simply repeal the rule without providing a 
 
 157  Id. at 33.  
 158  Disapproving The Rule Submitted By The Department Of Labor Relating To The 
Definition Of The Term “Fiduciary,” H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2016). 
 159  ICI, “Retirement Assets Total $25.0 Trillion in Third Quarter 2016,” available at 
https://www.ici.org/ research/stats/retirement/ret_17_q3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 160  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fiduciary Investment Advice: Regulatory Impact Analysis (Apr. 
14, 2015), available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/ 
rules-and-regulations/proposed-regulations/1210-AB32-2/conflictsofinterestria.pdf (last  
visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 161  Id. 
 162  Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993) 
(quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). 
 163  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 160. 
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comprehensive analysis of its own, illustrating why the rule should be 
repealed, would be an arbitrary and irrational act. 
Based on this analysis, while the courts grant considerable deference 
to the legislature for due process cases, there is evidence that a repeal of 
the DOL rule by a policy rider in an appropriation bill—which would 
likely receive little, if any, debate, and would not be accompanied by any 
type of empirical research supporting repeal—would effectively violate 
the due process rights of IRA holders who have BIC contracts. 
V. POLICY RIDERS ARE NOT AN EFFECTIVE POLICYMAKING VEHICLE 
The use of substantive policy riders in the appropriations process is 
an ineffective method to create policy for regulatory agencies. 
A. Congressional Disapproval 
While Congress routinely waives its rules to allow substantive 
legislation to be attached to appropriation bills, Congress has consistently 
warned against these measures.  In 1946, the Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress (“JCOC”) recommended that the practice of 
attaching legislation to appropriation bills be discontinued.164  The JCOC 
report stated: 
[t]he practice of attaching legislation to appropriation bills is 
often destructive of orderly procedure . . . Sometimes they 
contradict action previously approved in carefully considered 
legislation.  In most cases such legislation is adopted under 
the parliamentary guise of ‘limiting provisos,’ avoiding 
points of order that would be raised against them by 
purporting to restrict the spending of Government funds.165 
The JCOC report went on to state that these practices, “when used for 
purposes other than to effect real economies, should be prohibited by a 
tightening of the rules” otherwise the “regular jurisdiction of the standing 
committees . . . will continue to be impinged upon by the appropriating 
committees.  Much added work in Government departments and by 
private attorneys is caused by attaching legislative riders on appropriation 
bills.”166 
B. Executive Disapproval 
The executive branch, under both Republican and Democratic 
administrations, has long worried about the unconstitutional 
Congressional encroachment.  In 1880, President Rutherford B. Hayes 
stated, “I am firmly convinced that appropriation bills ought not to 
 
 164  S. REP. NO. 79-1011, at 23 (1946). 
 165  Id. at 23-24. 
 166  Id. 
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contain any legislation not relevant to the application or expenditure of 
the money thereby appropriated, and that by a strict adherence to this 
principle an important and much-needed reform will be 
accomplished.”167  President Hayes emphasized that policy riders 
“invite[] attacks upon the independence and constitutional powers of the 
Executive by providing an easy and effective way of constraining 
Executive discretion.”168  In 1945, President Harry Truman stated that 
“Congress has acted contrary to its own declared position, and has 
attempted to effect a far-reaching change in the organization of the 
Executive Branch” and that substantive legislation “should not be dealt 
with as riders to appropriations bills.”169  In 1987, President Ronald 
Reagan, when signing an appropriation bill, stated: 
Article II of the Constitution assigns responsibility for 
executing the law to the President.  While the Congress is 
empowered to enact new or different laws, it may not 
indirectly interpret and implement existing laws, which is an 
essential function allocated by the Constitution to the 
executive branch.  If the Congress disagrees with a statutory 
interpretation advanced by the executive branch—or with the 
efforts of the executive branch to defend or prosecute judicial 
action based on that interpretation-the Congress may, of 
course, amend the underlying statute.  The use of an 
appropriations bill for this purpose, however, is inconsistent 
with the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.170 
C. Normal Legislative Process Encourages Informed Deliberation 
The normal legislative process provides ample opportunity for 
Members of Congress to consider the subject matter of the proposed bill, 
as well as public scrutiny, in the form of committee research and 
recommendations, floor debates, and conference reports.171  In contrast, 
appropriation riders receive very little, if any, deliberation and 
 
 167  President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto of Appropriations Bill (May 4, 1880) (transcript 
available at http://www. rbhayes.org/clientuploads/RBHSpeeches/speechrbh514.htm).  
 168  Id. 
 169  President Harry Truman, Veto of Bill Making Supplemental Appropriations for the 
Federal Security Agency (Jul. 15, 1948) (transcript available at https://trumanlibrary.org/ 
publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=1681) (Truman also stated that the “legislation, which is 
of such paramount importance to the interests of millions of wage earners and employers, and 
which is plainly substantive in nature, was passed by the Congress entirely without reference 
to or hearings by the legislative committees concerned with such matters. Neither the House 
Committee on Education and Labor nor the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
was given an opportunity to consider the measure. Instead it was conceived by a subcommittee 
on appropriations and tacked onto an appropriations bill.”).  
 170  President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing H.R. 1827 into Law (Jul. 11, 1987) 
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34542) (emphasis added).  
 171  The Legislative Process, CONGRESS.ORG, http://congress.org/advocacy-101/the-
legislative-process/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
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specifically prevent any public involvement or informed legislative 
debate.  Policy riders are often attached to must-pass spending legislation, 
which forces the President to accept the riders or face the possibility of a 
government shut-down. 
Significantly, there is a substantial difference between the normal 
legislative process and the introduction of a policy rider into an 
appropriation bill or continuing resolution.  In the chart below, the lack 
of deliberation and transparency often seen when policy riders are 
attached to must-pass spending legislation, is illustrated: 
Normal Legislative Process Policy Rider Process 
Bill Drafted Policy Rider Drafted 
Bill Referred to Committee and 
Subcommittee for Study and 
Hearings  
 
Bill “Marked Up” by 
Subcommittee 
 
Subcommittee Vote   
Bill Reviewed by Full Committee 
(Further Study and Hearings 
Possible) 
 
Full Committee Vote  
Publication of Written Report on 
Bill 
 
Floor Action Scheduled on Bill  
Bill Debated on Floor  
Bill Voted on in Chamber  
Bill Referred to Other Chamber 
(Generally Follows Same Route 
Through Committee and Floor 
Action) 
 
Bill Sent to Conference (Both 
House and Senate Must Approve 
Conference Report) 
Policy Rider Slipped Into 
Appropriations Bill / Continuing 
Resolution 
Bill Sent to President Appropriations Bill / Continuing 
Resolution Sent to President 
(Includes Policy Riders) 
D. Policy Riders Negate Public Notice and Comment 
Policy riders that are attached to basic legislation, and thus force the 
President to sign the bill into law, negate any public comment received 
throughout the rulemaking process.  Under the Administrative Procedure 
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Act (“APA”), when conducting informal rulemaking, administrative 
agencies are required to provide the public with adequate notice of a 
proposed rule followed by a meaningful opportunity to comment on the 
rule’s content.172  Additionally, for matters of “great” importance, the 
APA requires the agency to allow for “more elaborate public 
procedures.”173  It would be nonsensical then for Congress to mandate the 
public’s participation in the rulemaking process, but then later negate that 
important participation. 
The DOL “fiduciary” rulemaking,174 discussed earlier in this Article, 
provides a good example of the importance of public participation.  The 
DOL provided an extraordinarily lengthy and transparent notice and 
comment process, which included more than 160 days of open public 
comment, over 3,000 comment letters (including over 300,000 individual 
comments), and four days of public hearings with seventy-five witnesses.  
Throughout the comment process, Secretary of Labor Tom Perez and 
DOL staff held hundreds of meetings with Members of Congress, 
financial services firms and organizations, and consumer groups. 
Members of Congress actively participated in the rulemaking 
process.  Over one hundred Members of Congress provided comment on 
the DOL rulemaking.175  As noted above, Congressional participation in 
the rulemaking process is encouraged—it is entirely proper for Members 
of Congress to represent the interests of their constituents before 
administrative agencies engaged in informal, general policy 
rulemaking.176  This Article agrees that it was not unconstitutional for 
Congress to participate in the rulemaking. 
However, while participation in the comment process was 
constitutional, the various attempts to stop the rulemaking process by 
Members of Congress was unconstitutional.  In December 2015, 
lawmakers attempted to attach a rider to an omnibus spending bill that 
would “require the Department of Labor to publish its fiduciary rule for 
another comment period before finalizing the rule.”177  Additionally, in a 
 
 172  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 173  ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 259 
(1946). 
 174  Department of Labor, Definition of the Term “Fiduciary:” Conflict of Interest Rule—
Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pts. 2509, 
2510, 2550); Department of Labor, Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002 
(Apr. 8, 2016) (29 C.F.R. Pt. 2550). 
 175  Employee Benefits Security Administration, Comments on Conflict of Interest 
Proposed Rule, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and- 
regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2 (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
 176  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 177  Melanie Waddell, Spending Bill Rider Would Delay DOL Fiduciary Rule by Adding 
Comment Period, THINKADVISOR (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/12/07/ 
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November 2016 letter, Senator Ron Johnson advised the DOL that 
implementation of the fiduciary rule should be halted, because the 
regulation “will very likely be rescinded.”178  The proposed policy rider 
and action requested in the letter would have violated the separation of 
powers by having the legislature interfere with the execution of the law, 
i.e., conducting a rulemaking to implement a statute, in this case ERISA.  
As noted above, “[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement 
the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”179 
Congress, by using a policy rider to repeal or delay the rule, would 
be negating the voices of hundreds of thousands of individuals who 
participated in the rulemaking process.  Interestingly, they will also be 
negating the voices of those Members of Congress who participated in 
the rulemaking process.  This Article submits that the Constitution should 
not allow one Member of Congress to negate the voices of hundreds of 
thousands of American citizens by simply attaching a policy rider to a 
piece of legislation.180 
VI. CASE STUDIES 
Stand-alone legislation directing agency action may also violate the 
Constitution.  While this Article focuses on policy riders attached to 
appropriation bills, and these bills are currently stand-alone pieces of 
legislation, they could be added to a future appropriations bill.181 
A. Retail Investor Protection Act (H.R. 1090) 
In February 2015, Representative Ann Wagner, who represents 
Missouri’s 2nd District,182  introduced the Retail Investor Protection Act 
 
spending-bill-rider-would-delay-dol-fiduciary-rule. 
 178  Letter from Ron Johnson, Sen. from Wisconsin, to Tom Perez, Dep’t of Labor Sec’y 
(Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/chairman-johnson-letter-to-dol-on-
fiduciary-rule. 
 179  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). 
 180  “[I]t is proper you should understand what I deem the essential principles of our 
Government, and consequently those which ought to shape its Administration . . . [such as] 
the diffusion of information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason . . . .”  
President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (transcript available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp). 
 181  Sen. Mike Lee, Restoring Congressional Accountability Through Appropriations 
Process, THE DAILY SIGNAL (May 2, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/02/restoring-
congressional-accountability-through-appropriations-process/ (“As Congress proceeds 
through the appropriations process this Spring, each spending bill presents an opportunity to 
advance structural reforms that would restore congressional accountability over federal 
regulations.”).  
 182  Press Release, Rep. Ann Wagner, Rep. Wagner Statement on the Introduction of the 
Retail Investor Protection Act (Feb. 25, 2015), https://wagner.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/rep-wagner-statement-on-the-introduction-of-the-retail-investor (last visited Dec. 
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(“RIPA”).183  RIPA would prohibit the DOL from implementing its 
fiduciary rule until sixty days after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) issues a final rule governing standards of conduct 
for brokers and dealers under specified law.184  RIPA amends sections of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;185 however, this Article will focus 
on the section concerning the DOL fiduciary rule. 
RIPA, if enacted, would violate the Constitution.  First, it is unlawful 
under current Supreme Court precedent.  In Sierra Club, the Supreme 
Court held that Congressional interference could be unlawful if the 
“content of the pressure on the [decisionmaker] is designed to force him 
to decide upon factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable 
statute” and also that the determination made “must be affected by those 
extraneous considerations.”186  Following the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning, in ATX, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation, 
the DC Circuit held that “an administrative decision must be based 
‘strictly on the merits and completely without regard to any 
considerations not made relevant by Congress in the applicable 
statutes.’”187  RIPA would force the DOL to base its implementation of 
the fiduciary rule on the actions of another government agency (“SEC”), 
rather than the applicable factors under ERISA.  These factors include, 
but are not limited to, increasing “the likelihood that participants and 
beneficiaries under single-employer defined benefit pension plans will 
receive their full benefits.”188 
Second, RIPA violates the separation of powers under the 
Constitution.  Forcing the DOL to stop implementation of its fiduciary 
rule,189 which has the force of law,190 effectively removes DOL’s ability 
to faithfully execute the laws under the Constitution.  It is important to 
note that RIPA does not amend the underlying ERISA statute, but rather 
 
27, 2017). 
 183  Retail Investor Protection Act, H.R. 1090, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 184  H.R. 1090, 114th Cong. § 2. 
 185  15 U.S.C. § 78 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 186  Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 409-10. 
 187  ATX, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(quoting D. C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
 188  29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90). 
 189  See Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928); see also J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). 
 190  New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63 (1988) (“The Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution gives force to federal action of this kind by stating that ‘the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance’ of the Constitution ‘shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.’  U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.  The phrase ‘Laws of the United States’ encompasses 
both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly adopted in 
accordance with statutory authorization.”). 
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it directs DOL to not implement a properly created federal law. 
B. Protecting American Families’ Retirement Advice Act (H.R. 
355) 
In January 2017, Representative Joe Wilson, who represents South 
Carolina’s 2nd District,191 introduced the Protecting American Families’ 
Retirement Advice Act (H.R. 355).192  The Act would require the DOL 
to delay the effective date of its fiduciary rule for two years from the date 
of the legislation. 
The Act violates the separation of powers under the Constitution.  
Forcing the DOL to stop implementation of its fiduciary rule,193 which 
has the force of law,194 effectively removes DOL’s ability to faithfully 
execute the laws under the Constitution.  Significantly, similar to RIPA, 
the Act does not amend the underlying ERISA statute, but it does direct 
DOL to not implement a properly created federal law. 
C. Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists 
Act (H.R. 3438) 
In September 2016, Representative Tom Marino, who represents 
Pennsylvania’s 10th District,195 introduced the Require Evaluation before 
Implementing Executive Wishlists Act of 2016 (“REVIEW Act”) (H.R. 
3438).196  The REVIEW Act would require agencies to postpone the 
effective date of high-impact rules ($1 billion impact on the economy) 
until the final disposition of all actions seeking judicial review of the 
rule.197 
The REVIEW Act would illegally interfere with the President’s 
constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”198  
It effectively stops an administrative agency from implementing a 
regulation until any litigation brought against the agency with respect to 
 
 191  Press Release, Rep. Joe Wilson, Wilson Introduces the Protecting American Families’ 
Retirement Advice Act  (Jan. 6, 2017), https://joewilson.house/gov/media-center/press- 
releases/wilson-introduces-the-protecting-american-families-retirement-advice-act. 
 192  Protecting American Families’ Retirement Advice Act, H.R. 355, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 193  See Springer, 277 U.S. at 202; see also Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406. 
 194  New York, 486 U.S. at 63. 
 195  Press Release, Rep. Tom Marino, Reps. Marino, Goodlatte Applaud Committee 
Passage of Bill to Stop “High Impact” Regulations (Sept. 8, 2016), https://marino.house.gov/ 
media-center/press-releases/reps-marino-goodlatte-applaud-committee-passage-bill-stop-
high-impact. 
 196  Require Evaluation before Implementing Executive Wishlists Act, H.R. 3438, 114th 
Cong. (2016). 
 197  H.R. 3438 § 3. 
 198  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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the rulemaking has concluded.  In Bowsher, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Congress may not, “in practical terms, reserve . . . control over the 
execution of the laws.”199  By not allowing agencies to implement rules 
in a timely fashion, this is exactly what the REVIEW Act allows 
Congress to do. 
D. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (H.R. 
427) 
In July 2015, now Senator Todd Young, who at the time was a 
Congressman representing Indiana’s 9th District, introduced the 
Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (“REINS 
Act”).200  The REINS Act would require “a joint resolution of approval 
of major rules to be enacted before such rules may take effect” and that 
“if a joint resolution of approval is not enacted by the end of 70 session 
days or legislative days, as applicable, after the agency proposing the rule 
submits its report on such rule to Congress, the major rule shall be 
deemed not to be approved and shall not take effect.”201 
The REINS Act would impermissibly interfere with the President’s 
constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”202  
It effectively allows Congress, the branch that creates laws, to also 
control the execution of those laws.  As noted in Chadha, “Congress must 
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is altered or 
revoked.”203  In Bowsher, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress may 
not, “in practical terms, reserve . . . control over the execution of the 
laws.”204  Unfortunately, this is exactly what the REINS Act would 
accomplish. 
VII. SOLUTIONS 
A. Enforce Congressional Rules 
The simplest solution to the use of appropriation riders is for 
Congress to enforce their own rules and not allow Members of Congress 
to waive the rules concerning the attachment of substantive legislation to 
appropriation bills.  As noted above, legislating through appropriation 
riders violates both Senate and House rules—generally legislative 
 
 199  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 715 (1986). 
 200  Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act, H.R. 427, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
 201  H.R. 427 § 3. 
 202  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 203  INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983). 
 204  Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 715. 
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provisions may not be included in appropriation bills.205 
This Article proposes two methods for handling policy riders.  The 
first is to draft legislation that would codify the current Congressional 
guidance with respect to legislating in appropriation bills and remove 
Congress’ authority to waive those rules.  The second would be to draft 
legislation that would mandate greater transparency in the appropriations 
process with respect to the addition of policy riders.  While this Article 
submits that many policy riders are unconstitutional, politically it will be 
very difficult to ban this practice entirely. 
 
Option 1: Prohibiting Policy Riders 
 
AN ACT 
To amend chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, to provide 
that substantive policy riders may not be attached to 
appropriations bills and/or continuing resolutions. 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Removing Policy Riders from 
the Appropriations Process Act of 2017”. 
 
SEC. 2. PURPOSE. 
The purpose of this Act is to increase accountability in the 
appropriations process. Section 3 of article 2 of the United 
States Constitution mandates that the President shall ensure 
faithful execution of the laws passed by the legislature. Over 
time, Congress has consistently intruded upon this executive 
branch authority by attaching policy riders to appropriations 
bills that interfere with the executive’s power to interpret and 
execute laws passed by Congress. In effect, Congress has 
acquired control over the execution of the laws. By removing 
Congress’s ability to attach policy riders to appropriations 
bills that would interfere with executive enforcement of the 
law, the Act will result in an improved regulatory process, 
and a legislative branch that is truly accountable to the 
American people for the laws imposed upon them. 
 
SEC. 3. REMOVING POLICY RIDERS FROM THE 
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS. 
Chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, is amended to read 
as follows: 
 
 
CHAPTER 43—CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
Sec. 4304. Prohibition on Substantive Limitation Policy 
 
 205  Deschler’s Precedents, vol. 8, chapter 26, § 24. 
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Riders in Appropriations Bills. 
 
Legislative provisions containing language that place 
substantive limitations on agencies’ implementation of 
statutory law and interferes with the execution of statutory 
law in the appropriations process are prohibited from being 
reported in general appropriations bills and amendments to 
appropriations bills. 
 
4305. Prohibition on Substantive Limitation Policy Riders in 
Continuing Resolutions. 
 
Legislative provisions containing language that places 
substantive limitations on agencies’ implementation of 
statutory law and interferes with the execution of statutory 
law are prohibited from being reported in a continuing 
resolution. 
 
Option 2: Increasing Transparency in the Appropriations Process 
 
AN ACT 
To amend chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, to 
increase transparency with respect to substantive policy 
riders attached to appropriations bills and/or continuing 
resolutions. 
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Increasing Transparency in the 
Appropriations Process Act of 2017”. 
 
SECTION 2. PURPOSE. 
The purpose of this Act is to increase transparency in the 
appropriations process. Section 3 of article 2 of the United 
States Constitution mandates that the President shall ensure 
faithful execution of the laws passed by the legislature. Over 
time, Congress has consistently intruded upon this executive 
branch authority by attaching policy riders to appropriations 
bills that interfere with the executive’s power to interpret and 
execute laws passed by Congress.  In effect, Congress has 
acquired control over the execution of the laws.  By requiring 
Congress to be more transparent with respect to policy riders, 
the Act will result in a legislative branch that is truly 
accountable to the American people for the laws imposed 
upon them. 
 
SEC. 3. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN THE 
APPROPRIATION PROCESS. 
Chapter 43 of title 2, United States Code, is amended to read 
as follows: 
 
CHAPTER 43—CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
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Sec. 4304. Increasing Transparency for Policy Riders in 
Appropriations Bills. 
 
(a) Appropriations Committee staff shall create a central 
list of all policy riders included in an appropriations 
bill.  The list shall: 
 
(1) include a section describing the purpose and 
intent of each rider, along with the expected 
impact on taxpayers and the economy; 
 
(2) be made available to the public in a machine 
readable format in advance of any vote on the 
appropriations bill. 
 
(b) Appropriations Committee staff shall highlight the 
policy riders in the text of the appropriations bill so 
interested parties can easily find the language in the 
bill. 
 
4305. Increasing Transparency for Policy Riders in 
Continuing Resolutions. 
 
(a) Appropriations Committee staff shall create a central 
list of all policy riders included in a continuing 
resolution.  The list shall: 
 
(1) include a section describing the purpose and 
intent of each rider, along with the expected 
impact on taxpayers and the economy; 
 
(2) be made available to the public in a machine 
readable format in advance of any vote on the 
continuing resolution. 
 
(b) Appropriations Committee staff shall highlight the 
policy riders in the text of the continuing resolution 
so interested parties can easily find the language in 
the bill. 
B. Limited Line Item Veto 
Congress could create legislation that would allow for a line item 
veto limited to policy riders in appropriation bills or continuing 
resolutions.  This legislation would allow: (1) policy riders to be attached 
to appropriation bills and continuing resolutions; (2) President to veto 
individual policy riders without having to veto the entire spending bill; 
and (3) Congress to override the individual veto.  This is a policy proposal 
advanced by the non-profit group No Labels.206 
 
 206  Understanding the Line-Item Veto with a Twist, NO LABELS, https://www.nolabels.org 
/understanding-the-line-item-veto-with-a-twist/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017). 
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In Clinton v. City of New York, the “Supreme Court found that the 
line-item veto violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which 
says that the president does not have the power to unilaterally amend or 
repeal legislation passed by Congress.”207  However, No Labels contends, 
and this Article agrees, by sending the rescinded part of the bill back to 
Congress for an expedited up or down vote, a limited line item veto 
complies with the Presentment Clause of the Constitution and the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Clinton.208 
This procedure would allow the President to separate controversial 
policy riders from must-pass spending legislation, and would also 
provide Congress with the ability to move forward by overriding the 
President’s veto with respect to individual policy riders. 
In 2006, Representative Paul Ryan introduced similar legislation 
known as the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006.209  This bill would 
have authorized “the President to propose the cancellation (line item veto) 
of any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, item of direct 
spending, or targeted tax benefit within 45 days after its enactment.”210  
The bill passed the House, but was not considered in the Senate.  While 
this bill is similar, this Article contends that the No Labels proposal is 
more appropriate. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Congress has slowly increased its control over the activities of the 
executive branch, through directly influencing administrative 
proceedings and through the use of substantive policy riders in the 
appropriations process.  In sum and substance, Congress has 
unconstitutionally acquired control over the execution of laws.  This 
Article submits that these actions are unconstitutional and must be 
challenged.  Over two hundred years ago, George Mason, then a delegate 
to the United States Constitutional Convention of 1787, issued a warning 
regarding “the practice of tacking foreign matter[s] to money bills.”211  
Today, this concern is even greater, with Congress freely adding policy 
riders to appropriation bills, many of which receive little to no debate or 
public scrutiny.  This practice must be prohibited, or in the alternative, it 
must be more transparent. 
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